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Discrimination in Hiring 
Based on Potential and Realized Fertility: 
Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment* 
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Abstract 
 
Due to conventional gender norms, women are more likely to be in charge of childcare 
than men. From an employer’s perspective, in their fertile age they are also at “risk” of 
pregnancy. Both factors potentially affect hiring practices of firms. We conduct a large-
scale correspondence test in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, sending out approx. 
9,000 job applications, varying job candidate’s personal characteristics such as marital 
status and age of children. We find evidence that, for part-time jobs, married women with 
older kids, who likely finished their childbearing cycle and have more projectable 
childcare chores than women with very young kids, are at a significant advantage vis-à-
vis other groups of women. At the same time, married, but childless applicants, who have 
a higher likelihood to become pregnant, are at a disadvantage compared to single, but 
childless applicants to part-time jobs. Such effects are not present for full-time jobs, 
presumably, because by applying to these in contrast to part-time jobs, women signal that 
they have arranged for external childcare.  
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1 Introduction 
Females and males still have very different experiences in the labor market, for example 
with respect to wages, career paths or assignment of tasks. Differences in terms of pay and 
career paths are not only the subject of debate in the popular press but are well documented 
in the academic literature. Goldin (2014) argues that, in the last century, the roles of men and 
women have greatly converged and that the “last chapter” has been opened for women to 
achieve full labor market equality.1 Even if the situation of women in the labor market has 
markedly improved over the last decades, the question of why there is a gender asymmetry 
in the first place has not yet been fully settled.  
One possible reason for gender inequality, that receives substantial consideration in the 
literature, is motherhood and its effects in the labor market. For example, Kleven, Landais 
and Søgaard (forthcoming) recently showed that, despite considerable gender convergence, 
in Denmark the presence of children accounts for most of the remaining earnings inequality 
between men and women in the labor market. Their empirical approach was adopted by 
Kleven et al. (2019a) who examined child penalties in different countries and found 
particularly negative effects of children on earnings in the German-speaking countries that 
are also examined in this study. Sometimes such earnings differences are interpreted as 
reflecting discrimination. Of course, depending on the data and empirical strategy used, 
identification problems when interpreting findings on child penalties may occur. Already the 
early human capital literature (especially the work of Mincer, 1962 and Mincer and 
Polachek, 1974) emphasized that choices concerning childcare, labor supply, occupation and 
human capital investments of (future) mothers could generate the same patterns in the data.2 
As a result, numerous endogeneity issues (e.g., concerning effort at work, selection into 
work) occur in non-experimental data (e.g., Kunze, 2008) that make the identification of 
discrimination in wage setting difficult.  
In this study, we therefore resort to an experimental setting that allows for full 
randomization of motherhood status and thereby enables us to clearly identify the occurrence 
of discrimination in hiring. The results will thus allow us to test whether also demand-side 
                                                             
1 Blau and Kahn (2017), for example, show that the gender wage gap in the US has decreased from 1980 to 
2010; however, while in 1980 differences in education played an important role for the difference in wages, this 
was much less the case in 2010. 
2 Mincer’s (1962) path-breaking work on the labour supply of married womens focuses on the number of hours 
supplied by mothers as a function of children’s age (and husband’s earnings), i.e. Mincer highlights the issue of 
compatibility of hours of work with the presence of children of different ages. Mincer and Polachek (1974), apart 
from deriving different human capital investment and occupational choices depending on expected work-
interruptions, stress how families see childcare and labour supply as a joint optimization problem: “the behavior 
of the family unit implies a division of labor within it.” (p.S76).  
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effects (employer’s behavior) play a role in the lower labor market participation rates of 
women at different stages of family formation.3  
Discrimination is commonly defined as a situation where individuals of identical 
productivity are treated differently because of the demographic group to which they belong. 
“Taste-based” discrimination is rooted in preferences (Becker, 1957), whereas “statistical 
discrimination” (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973) is considered a rational response of employers 
to missing information about the applicant’s productivity.4 
In our experiment, we examine two routes how motherhood may encourage statistical 
discrimination by firms. First, one “risk” (from the employers’ perspective) that falls 100% 
on females, and not on males, is the risk of pregnancy. This comes with costs to employers 
who need to find at least temporary replacement for female employees giving birth. 
Second, traditional gender norms assign childcare responsibilities primarily to women. 
Because women have a higher likelihood of dealing with household chores related to 
childcare – for example they may have to take a day off to take care of a sick child – firms 
may find hiring females costlier than otherwise similar males. Among females, those with 
older children may be less likely to have to deal with childcare issues, as older children are 
in school and/or less likely to suffer from health issues that require parental attention. 
To test these possible effects of potential pregnancy as well as childcare, in our study, we 
look at the hiring chances of women who are in different phases of their family formation. 
We conduct a correspondence testing experiment in the German-speaking countries, where 
we send out applications that signal identical productivity but a different family status. Our 
study relies on the fact that in the countries examined, Germany, Switzerland and Austria, 
résumés routinely include detailed information about the job candidate’s personal 
characteristics, such as age, gender, marital status and number of children. As such, in our 
experiment, our thirty-year-old fictitious job candidates are randomly given varying 
household demographics, ranging from being single and childless or being married and 
childless, to being married and having two young or two older children. One additional 
profile provides no information on household composition. Our candidates apply to 
secretarial and accounting jobs in all three countries, answering job advertisements posted on 
internet job portals.  
We contrast employers’ reactions to our candidates in full- and part-time positions, 
because applicants to full-time jobs implicitly signal that they have childcare arrangements 
                                                             
3 Female labour force participation still falls short of the male labor force participation in most countries. The 
female-to-male ratio in labor force participation rates is well below 1 in all European countries. In the German-
speaking countries Germany, Switzerland and Austria, the ratio was 0.806, 0.810 and 0.806, respectively, in 
2012. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/labour-force-participation-rate-female-male-ratio (accessed 4 March 
2019). 
4 See also the discussion in Guryan and Charles (2013). 
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in place, while those applying to part-time jobs indicate that they are looking for a job that is 
compatible with childcare duties. Hence, we expect employers to be more concerned about 
marital status and age of children for those applying to part-time jobs. Our findings are in 
line with these hypotheses. 
Our study includes approx. 9,000 observations (i.e. job applications), covering the largest 
cities in three different countries, full- and part-time jobs, as well as female and male 
applicants. Experimental methods to detect discrimination, such as audit studies and 
correspondence testing, are able to overcome some limitations present in other empirical 
approaches (see Neumark, 2018). However, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) show that the 
measurement of discrimination from these studies may be biased if the employer does not 
observe all determinants of productivity. Neumark (2012) proposes an empirical method to 
address this problem, which allows for the computation of unbiased estimates of 
discrimination. Our results are robust to this correction. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We next present a literature review. Section 3 describes 
the institutional context of our study, and section 4 the implementation of our study. In 
section 5, we present our results. In section 6, we conclude by discussing the results and their 
policy implications. 
 
2 Previous Studies and Differences to the Current Experiment 
Our study is part of the burgeoning literature of field experiments, namely audit studies and 
correspondence testing (see Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Neumark, 2018; Baert, 2018; Rich, 
2014). In correspondence testing, résumés of applicants that are matched in all relevant 
qualifications, like schooling and job experience, but which differ with respect to their 
demographic characteristics, are sent out in response to job advertisements. While quite a 
few correspondence tests examined sex discrimination more generally in the past, the 
literature is surprisingly scarce when it comes to the question of fertility.5 We next describe 
those studies in detail. 
Firth (1982) conducted a correspondence test for accountants in the UK. He compared the 
success rates of males and females who were married or single; married individuals were 
further presented with and without children. The success rates of males were always higher 
than those of females and the difference widened in the presence of children.  
In their correspondence study in France, Duguet and Petit (2005) and Petit (2007) varied 
the age and family status of their applicants, comprising three types: 25 y.o. and childless, 37 
                                                             
5 As Bertrand and Duflo (2017) write: “A topic of interest for future work would be to apply the correspondence 
method to measure the extent to which a bias exists against women with children, or against young women who 
may have children in the future.” (p. 325). 
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y.o., single and childless, and 37 y.o., married with two children. They further compared 
males and females along those types. The different age groups were meant to indicate 
different probabilities of future childbearing. The authors found no evidence of 
discrimination against older women relative to older men. However, the younger female 
types received callbacks significantly less frequently than the younger men, when applying 
to highly qualified jobs, which the authors attribute to higher maternity costs in these 
occupations. Bartoš (2015) used a similar design for his correspondence study, conducted in 
the Czech Republic. It considered younger (25 y.o.) childless males and females, and older 
(41 y.o.) males and females, who were either childless or had two children instead. All job 
applicants were married. He found no difference in average callback rates among the 
younger male and female applicants but older women were preferred to older men. In line 
with Duguet and Petit (2005), Bartoš (2015) identified weak evidence for a motherhood 
penalty for younger women, but only when applying to highly qualified positions. 
Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) report both on a lab experiment and on a correspondence 
test, where same-gender applications (both female or both male) with and without children 
were sent to employers. In both experiments, childless women were preferred to other 
demographic profiles, and mothers adversely treated compared to fathers.6 With a similar 
design, Bygren, Erlandsson and Gähler (2017) tested parenthood effects in Sweden in one of 
the most recent studies. However, they did not find any systematic discrimination based on 
sex or parental status. 
A different design was used in the correspondence test of Duguet, Parquet and Petit 
(2017), who sought to identify a maternity penalty by comparing employer response rates 
across short- and long-term position within an occupation. They found evidence of a career 
interruption penalty in one of the three occupations examined. 
Baert (2014) provided more indirect evidence compatible with a penalty for potential 
maternity in an experiment that compared hiring chances of young as well as middle-aged 
heterosexual and lesbian women. While in his study, lesbian women were preferred to 
heterosexuals when they were young (and thus in childbearing age) there was no difference 
for middle-aged women of different sexual orientation.7 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 In the field study, childless women were called back 2.1 more times compared to mothers. In the lab 
experiment, childless women were recommended for hire 1.8 times more frequently than mothers. 
7 Baert, De Pauw and Deschacht (2016) found that hiring discrimination of women was higher when the new job 
was higher in the job latter than the one currently held. They suggest that because of higher investment costs at 
higher occupational levels, this may be a manifestation of the career penalty of motherhood. 
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Differences to Our Study 
As this overview over existing correspondence tests has shown, many previous studies 
compared women with and without children. However, not knowing more about a woman’s 
family situation than the presence of children, it is difficult to assess her likelihood of 
pregnancy. Some authors try to address this problem by varying the age of the applicant and 
thus indicating whether a woman is still in her childbearing years.8 However, over the life-
cycle also non-fertility related productivity characteristics change, making it difficult to 
disentangle the effect of fertility in the empirical results.  
Also, when motherhood is indicated in a correspondence test, it may be perceived to 
make childbearing less likely, but it simultaneously signals that the woman possibly has to 
handle childcare chores. As a result, for an employer it is unclear whether a mother is 
attractive (because she has already finished her fertility cycle), or unattractive because she 
may be tied up with childcare issues leading to a lack of focus at work and potential 
absences.   
In this paper, we try to avoid some of the above-mentioned problems. First, we abstain 
from varying age so as not to introduce any confounding factors affecting invitation rates. 
All our candidates are therefore of identical age but at different stages of their family 
formation cycle. Second, we use much more nuanced indicators for potential motherhood 
and childcare chores. In particular, we work with single candidates and marrieds without 
kids, who differ in their childbearing probability. Further, we make use of the fact that 
childcare chores vary with the age of the children – they are especially high for young 
children who, e.g., are more likely to become sick and in need for immediate care. In our 
study, we therefore indicate the age of the children to allow employers to assess the level of 
childcare required.  
In addition to extensive indicators describing the family situation, while previous studies 
focused on full time jobs only, we also exploit differences between full- and part-time jobs. 
Applying to a part-time job indicates that a woman seeks to reconcile work and family life. 
We expect that employers offering part-time work find their jobs particularly suitable for 
women with (older) children, while they are nevertheless worried about maternity leave.  
Apart from its novel design, our correspondence study is also the first testing for realized 
or expected fertility effects in the German-speaking countries. As mentioned, the breadth of 
information routinely provided in applicants’ CVs allows us to inconspicuously place our 
family situation cues before employers.  
                                                             
8 Also Carlsson and Eriksson (2017) highlight labor market disruptions due to family formation and child care as 
one reason why women and men may have different age profiles in callback rates. Note that in our study, we 
hold age constant. 
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3 Context of the Current Study 
Job Applications in German-Speaking Countries 
The German-speaking countries provide an ideal context to experimentally analyze 
discrimination based on (potential) parenthood. First, the application process is rather 
“traditional”: in comparison to other countries, e.g., the UK, few firms work with employer-
provided application forms which make testing identical applications in a résumé study 
impossible. Second, and more importantly, applications provide extensive information on a 
candidate, not only concerning qualifications but also personal characteristics 
(Weichselbaumer, 2016). The crucial feature which we rely on is the fact that marital status 
and number of children are routinely included in the résumés. In our field experiment, we 
explore this possibility and convey information on the résumé about the age and number of 
children as well as on the marital status of the applicant. The fact that typical job application 
packages consist of a cover letter, the résumé, scans of certificates (school, apprenticeships, 
languages, etc.) and thereby provide detailed information on educational achievements and 
other human capital characteristics, renders statistical discrimination on other dimensions 
less likely. 
 
Institutional Features in Austria, Germany and Switzerland 
The countries examined differ with respect to their paternal leave and benefit policies (for 
details, see Appendix). In Austria and Germany, policies are relatively generous and allow 
parents to take a break from the duty to work for up to three years without termination of the 
employment in exchange for the suspension of pay. Different models of paternal benefits can 
be claimed which cover at least a part of the paternal leave period. In Switzerland, women 
are only entitled to maternal benefits for 14 weeks after birth and protected from firing until 
16 weeks after the birth of a child.9  
There is a large literature that examines the effect of paternity leave and child care 
policies (for an overview see Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017).10 However, Kleven et al. 
(2019b) show (for the setting of Austria) that such policies have little or no effect, at least on 
penalties with respect to women’s wages in the long run. Instead, as the authors illustrate in a 
different paper (Kleven et al., 2019a), long run child penalties in earnings strongly correlate 
                                                             
9 As a result, labor market participation rates for women with children under 3 years are somewhat higher in 
Switzerland than in the other countries (see WSI Genderdatenportal, 2018; Bundesamt für Statistik, 2017; 
Statistik Austria, 2016). According to the OECD Family Database (n.d.), also participation rates of 0-2-year-olds 
in childcare and pre-school service are higher in Switzerland in 2014 (38%, Germany: 32.3%, Austria: 19.2%). 
10 Of course, family policies may backfire and result in negative labour market outcomes for women in terms of 
hiring, wages and promotions, as is well documented in the literature. We discuss this issue, with particular 
consideration of equal pay laws, in the Appendix. 
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with gender norms. Thus, in their study, the particularly traditional gender norms in the 
German-speaking countries (they look at Germany and Austria specifically) explain the large 
child penalties observed there. 
Indeed, gender norms are relatively traditional in all three countries examined. For 
example, data from the 2012 sample of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on 
Family and Changing Gender Roles show that, among those answering the respective 
questions, in German-speaking countries, respondents feel more strongly than in the EU15 
that for women work and family is incompatible.11 In Austria, only 1.97% of respondents 
think that a mother of children in preschool age should work full-time. In Switzerland, that 
percentage is 5.33%, and in Germany 14.26%.12 In contrast, in the EU15, the corresponding 
figure is 17.10%. Looking at whether women should work when their youngest kid is at 
school, the pattern looks very similar: in Austria, 24.47% think women should work full-
time in that case, in Germany 30.45%, in Switzerland 11.47%, and in the EU15 47.05%. 
The conservative gender norms are also reflected in the high rates of female part-time 
work (in 2015, according to Eurostat: Germany 46.6%, Switzerland: 60.6%, Austria: 46.8%, 
EU-average: 31.1%), which is particularly prevalent for mothers with a partner. For 
example, in Switzerland, conditional on having a job, 58.6% of childless, partnered women 
(age 25 to 54) work full time. This fraction drops to 19.4% for mothers of similar 
demographics whose youngest child is 4 to 12 years old, with the remaining 80.6% working 
part-time.13 These numbers portray part-time as a form of labor market participation strongly 
associated with the presence of children. 
 
4 Design of the Experiment 
Family Types 
Because in other countries personal information about an applicant is usually relatively 
scarce, previous studies typically had to convey fertility information indirectly through 
varying applicant age and marital status. For example, previous studies inferred fertility 
discrimination from comparing sex discrimination between old and young applicants. 
However, age may have different effects by gender independently of fertility. We therefore 
deliberately held the age of our job candidates constant (at 30 years) and added a broad range 
of constellations regarding household composition to indicate different probabilities of 
                                                             
11 The EU15 provide a natural comparison for Western European countries. However, note that the ISSP 
questions were not asked in Greece, Italy and Luxembourg, thus, the “EU15” are only approximated.  
12 Note that the German figures include the former Communist East with more progressive gender norms, while 
our experiment ran in West-German cities and Berlin. As a result, the respective number is likely to be lower 
there. 
13 Authors’ calculations based on data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, table su-d-01.07.05.07 for 2017. 
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pregnancy and childcare obligations. Our applicants included female and male individuals 
that were single and childless (default), married and childless, and parents whose two 
children were either “young” (3 and 5 years) or “old” (7 and 9 years). By differentiating 
between these types, we sought to isolate different facets of fertility-related costs, in 
particular by distinguishing between potential fertility (in the comparison of single types 
with those who are married but have no children) from costs related to child-related chores 
given realized fertility (comparing between the parents of younger and of older children).  
The average fertility rate in Switzerland and Austria is 1.5 and 1.4 in Germany (see UN 
World Population Prospects, 2015). Consequently, the risk of pregnancy is highest for the 
married, childless female, small for mothers of two young children (given the low average 
fertility rate), and close to zero for the mothers of two older children. The latter is because 
parents of older children are more hesitant to start the child bearing and rearing cycle anew. 
This is shown for the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the richest panel data set in 
the German-speaking countries, in Figure 1, where we plot the age difference between the 
2nd and 3rd child for women who have 3 or more children (for the year 2014). As can be seen, 
more than 90% of women have their 3rd child less than 7 years after the 2nd. To the extent 
that employers are aware of this pattern, they will almost certainly assume that a woman 
with two older children (aged 7 and 9) in our experiment is not going to have a third child. 
Comparing parents of younger and older children, the former are more prone to having to 
deal with child-related chores and illnesses than the latter. Again, this is illustrated with data 
from the GSOEP in Figure 2, which shows that, in fact, both mothers and fathers of younger 
children have a higher number of absences due to sick children: the number of days absent 
because of a sick child are nearly double as high for parents of two young children than for 
parents of two older children. Mothers, however, have more child-related absences than 
fathers. 
It follows from here that parents of older children appear to be ideal candidates from the 
point of view of fertility-related costs to the employer: they convey low pregnancy risk and 
low costs associated with childcare chores. Parents of two younger children likewise have a 
very low pregnancy risk but potentially face child-related chores. Of course, single women 
without children may get pregnant in the future, however, at the point of hiring, they have no 
conventional family obligations at all. For this reason, we have no prior whether single 
women or women with older children are preferred by employers. We do, however, 
hypothesize that, first, single and childless candidates outrank the married and childless, as 
their risk of pregnancy is lower,14 and, second, that parents of older children are preferred by 
                                                             
14 According to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, childless, but married women are likely to have 
children sooner than childless singles aged 30. 
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the employer to parents of younger children who may require more care work. We cannot 
really sign how employers would rank the married and childless relative to the parents of 
small children. This depends on how high the costs of a potential pregnancy are perceived to 
be for the former, relative to the costs of the already present chores with small children, for 
the latter.  
In German-speaking countries, women with children seeking to improve their job 
opportunities sometimes include a sentence stating that they do not plan to increase their 
family size. The literal translation of a common statement (“Familienplanung 
abgeschlossen”) used is “family planning completed”, however, “family completed” may 
better capture the meaning. Because mothers of young children may be perceived as yet 
having some probability to have a third child, in a random subset of this group this sentence 
family completed was included in their application letter. The goal was to test, whether the 
inclusion of such statements, sometimes recommended by guidebooks and eagerly discussed 
in online forums,15 has an empirical basis and helps mothers seeking a job, even though from 
an economic perspective this sentence may be merely considered cheap talk. 
Finally, we included one additional “family type” that did not provide any information on 
a candidate’s family situation. The “no information” candidate was incorporated to check 
whether candidates can avoid discrimination by leaving out information on their family life 
in their résumé. Alternatively, it could be that firms treat such applications with suspicion. 
Since previous research has often shown opposing effects of family status for men and 
women (e.g., Firth, 1982), applications for both sexes were sent out.  
 
Full-Time versus Part-Time Jobs 
While full-time employment is the norm for men, in German-speaking countries, about half of 
employed women work part-time. In the occupations we consider, accountants and 
secretaries, 60% of women work part-time, according to data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel. Given the prevalence of part-time employment for women, we sent out 
applications to both full-time and part-time job advertisements, which the previous literature 
has not addressed. In the German speaking countries, part-time jobs are often considered an 
option for women with family obligations to reconcile work and family life. For this reason, 
                                                             
15 Examples for respective recommendations and online debates can be found, e.g., under the following links: 
https://www.karinleitmueller.at/bewerben-mit-kind, 
https://essentialtimes.wordpress.com/2011/09/27/bewerbung-3-lebenslauf, 
https://www.netmoms.de/fragen/detail/bewerbung-schreiben-wie-die-kinder-optimal-einbringen-22842483, 
http://www.parents.at/forum/archive/index.php/t-57132.html 
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results may differ for the different activity levels. In our experiment, we consider a job to be 
full-time if the corresponding occupation rate of the employee is at least 80%.  
Regarding potential effects of family type, our hypothesis is that employers will expect 
parents applying to full-time jobs to have arranged proper childcare, e.g., via grandparents or 
other child-minders, as otherwise they would not be able to consider a full-time job. If such 
arrangements are in place, parents are less likely to be absent from work if a child is sick. In 
contrast, parents applying to part-time jobs signal that they want to reconcile work and family 
life. Here, in all likelihood, in case of a sick child, parents themselves will have to look after 
their sick children, creating days of absence at work. 
We therefore expect any differences in callback rates between parents with older children 
and parents with younger children (who have to deal with more illnesses) to be more 
pronounced for part-time jobs than for full-time jobs. Similarly, any potential difference in 
callback rates between childless singles and childless, but married, applicants is also likely to 
be larger for part-time jobs because an employer might take an application of a married 
woman to a part-time position as a signal of an intended pregnancy. 
 
Other Characteristics of the Application Material 
In the German speaking countries, not only cover letters and a résumé are included in an 
application, but also certificates and school reports with degree and grade information. These 
were prepared to signal the relevant qualification in a good quality. Applicants were 
currently employed with their second employer. To allow us to send two applications to each 
firm, two templates were constructed which provided identical information with respect to 
human capital but which differed in aspects irrelevant to productivity (layout of the 
application, order of documents, birthplace, specific school attended of the same branch, 
etc.).  
We applied to secretarial and accounting jobs, because clerical jobs cover a large fraction 
of female employees in the country investigated and are therefore empirically relevant. We 
picked female-dominated jobs because we are interested in whether or not fertility aspects 
matter in occupations that are generally open to women.16 Indeed, a potentially high average 
acceptance rate of women in those jobs is not incompatible with preferential behavior toward 
female candidates credibly signaling to have low fertility risk in detriment of others unable 
to provide such a signal. Additionally, the labor demand in these jobs was large enough, so 
                                                             
16 In the German-speaking countries, it is difficult to identify male-dominated jobs with homogeneous 
qualification requirements and a large enough stream of vacancies, which is a precondition for conducting a 
correspondence test. 
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that a reasonably large data set could be collected, and job-profiles in these occupations are 
relatively homogeneous, thus allowing us to work with standardized applications. Finally, 
both occupations have a substantial number of full and part-time jobs, allowing us to study 
and compare potential discrimination in both. 
Applications were sent to job vacancies in the largest cities in Germany (Berlin, 
Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt and Stuttgart), the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland (Bern, Zurich and Basel), and Austria (Vienna).  
 
Procedure 
Data collection comprised the period March 2013-June 2015.17 Over this period of roughly 
two years, we sent out application packages consisting of a cover letter, a résumé, documents 
from the relevant educational institutions with degree and grade information, as well as 
reference letters. For “high quality” applicants, we also included IT and language 
certificates. In all cases, two applications with different templates were sent to each 
company. We randomized the “family/fertility type”, our treatment variable, but also other 
elements in the résumé such as the picture and name of the candidate as well as the general 
template of the application.  
Applications were sent out to all suitable job advertisements posted in online job portals. 
Suitability meant that some filtering was done to remove, for example, job agencies, likely to 
keep our profiles in their records for at least some time, or firms that were already included 
in our sample and would likely detect the experiment. Answers from the employers were 
received by email, mobile phone or regular mail (rejections always came by email or regular 
mail but invitations sometimes were conveyed in the form of voice messages on the 
answering machine). Whenever our candidates received an invitation to an interview, in 
order to minimize costs for the employer, we quickly declined alleging that another offer had 
materialized in the meantime.18  
 
                                                             
17 Data collection started in March 2013, with Switzerland, and was soon extended to Germany, in April that 
year. Data collection for Austria (Vienna) was initiated in June 2014. Austria was not a country in our initial 
research plan but the similarities in the job application procedure suggested that an extension to that country 
would serve as a useful comparison to the other two German speaking countries. Regarding 2015, data were 
essentially only being collected for Austria, though one city in Germany (Berlin) and one in Switzerland 
(Zurich) were also included in the continuation of the study to provide a benchmark to Austrian data. Despite 
data being collected for almost a year for Austria, we were not able to gather a high number of observations. 
18 Those critical of correspondence studies point out the costs to employers of having to deal with ‘fake 
applications’ which is why we decline invitations for job interviews right away. Yet, we would like to highlight 
that the German Federal Antidiscrimination Agency (2011) explicitly validates the legality of correspondence 
testing as a means to detect discrimination. 
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5 Results 
Our sample comprises nearly 9,000 observations, a large sample size compared to much of 
the existing literature related to our study.19 The variable callback measures whether an 
applicant was invited for an interview. 
Table 1, panel A illustrates the unconditional probability of receiving a callback for 
applications to full-time jobs and shows the marked differences between males and females. 
While for females, the unconditional probability of receiving a callback is 19.62%, it is only 
11.53% for males. When these numbers are disaggregated by occupation, men’s callback 
rate for secretarial jobs declines to 7.11% whereas the female rate becomes 16.45%. In 
accounting jobs, men receive a callback 16.72% of the time, whereas the female callback 
rate is 23.58%. The same pattern of female advantage is found at the country level. These 
sex differences in callback rates resonate with other studies surveyed in Riach and Rich 
(2006) and Rich (2014) concerning discrimination of men in female dominated jobs, and of 
women in male dominated activities.20 One possible explanation for these findings is 
employer selection based on gender stereotyping (Weichselbaumer, 2004). 
Turning to the different family types, for both female and male applicants, the differences 
in callback rates do not seem to be large for applications to full-time jobs. For women, they 
range from 18.36% (married, 2 young kids) to 20.58% (single, no kids).21  
Table 1, panel B shows callback rates for applications to part-time jobs. Interestingly, for 
women average callback rates are nearly identical to those for full-time jobs (19.22% vs. 
19.62%).22 However, there is substantially more variation across family types, now ranging 
from 13.11% for those who are married with no children to 27.18% for those who are 
married with 2 old children. 
 
                                                             
19 We originally collected an even richer set of profiles, but being concerned about multiple measures potentially 
related to the same information, we focus on the profiles described in the previous section. 
20 Nonetheless, there is no complete uniformity in occupations concerning whether discrimination negatively 
affects males or females. While callback decisions in secretarial jobs tend to disproportionately favour females, 
in accounting positions males are sometimes preferred (see, e.g., Table 4 in Rich, 2014). In Weichselbaumer 
(2004), for example, while women are strongly preferred to males in secretarial jobs, in accounting jobs, males 
and females are called back at similar rates. 
21 For the subset of those who were married with 2 young kids and who indicated in the cover letter to have their 
“family completed”, the callback rate was somewhat higher (24.1%). As we will see in the regression analysis, 
though, the difference between applications with and without this sentence is not statistically significant. 
22 For men, callback rates are substantially lower in part-time than full-time jobs (7.26% vs. 11.53%). 
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5.1 Multivariate Analysis  
In the following, we present our results from a variety of OLS regressions of the dependent 
variable “callback” on a broad set of controls.23 In addition to the treatment variables 
(fertility/family types), all regressions incrementally include controls for variables like city 
(Bern, Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna), time 
(quarter and year) of application sent, application characteristics and firm characteristics. 
Application characteristics include the occupation (secretary vs. accountant), the sex of the 
applicant, the template and the picture used in a specific application, the quality of the 
application (an application was of particularly high quality, when IT and English language 
certificates were included), and the quality of the fit of our profile to a particular vacancy.24 
The firm characteristics capture the sector (public sector, trade, manufacturing and services 
sectors), the range of business activity (local/regional, national, international), the firm size 
as given by the number of employees (seven dummy variables ranging from “1 to 20” to 
“more than 1000”), whether the firm was more than 20km away from the applicant’s address 
(distance from residence to the workplace), as well as whether the firm has an explicit 
antidiscrimination policy (according to its website). Descriptive statistics are given in Table 
A.1. 
 
Full-Time Jobs  
No Effects of Family Status and Family Type  
Table 2 shows the results for the pooled sample of women (i.e., covering all countries), 
where we regress the outcome dummy “callback” on the treatment variables (married w/o 
kids, married with two young kids, married with two old kids, no info, default: single w/o 
kids). We start with regressions that do not include any control variables. As a result, column 
1 essentially reproduces the descriptive statistics from Table 1.25 
In column 2, we split the category “individuals with two young kids” into two: those who 
did or did not include a sentence in the cover letter that they have their “family completed”, 
i.e. are not intending to have additional children. We formally test the equality of these two 
coefficients by a t-test (p-value: 0.19). Based on this, we cannot reject the Null-hypothesis 
                                                             
23 Results using Probit or Logit models (not shown) are very similar, as is common when the average of the 
outcome variable is outside the tails of the [0,1] interval. 
24 Three dummy variables reflected how well the set of fixed skills possessed by our applicants matched the 
requirements of each specific job ad that we answered. “Good fit” is a dummy variable coded as one when all the 
job requirements were met by our candidates; if our candidates’ qualifications did not fully meet the 
advertisement specifications, they were coded as having an “average fit” (when only minor requirements were 
not met), or as being a “bad fit” (when one crucial or two or more minor requirements were not satisfied). 
25 Throughout our analysis, standard errors are clustered at the company level. 
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that they are equal. Thus, adding a sentence on “family completion” does not lead to 
significantly different treatment of female applicants with two young kids who apply to full-
time jobs. 
Subsequent columns control for increasingly richer sets of covariates. Columns 3 and 4 
add city dummies, columns 5 and 6 add application characteristics, including year and 
quarter dummies, columns 7 and 8 add firm characteristics.26 
Our first important result from the multivariate analysis is the absence of statistically 
significant effects associated with family type for applications to full-time jobs: employers 
do not seem respond to the family situation of job applicants. Given that there is no clear 
evidence of discrimination based on one’s family situation in odd-numbered columns, it does 
not surprise that the statement on one’s family completion does not matter for callback 
probabilities (even-numbered columns). 
 
Part-Time Jobs 
Part-time jobs allow women to reconcile gender norms, which assign to them the 
responsibility for child care, with work life. For this reason, family type may affect hiring 
behavior of firms differently when part-time jobs are concerned. In particular, women 
without children applying for a part-time job may be perceived as planning to become 
mothers soon – especially if they are married. We also expect differences concerning the 
outcomes of mothers: While mothers applying to full-time jobs must have external childcare 
arranged, this is not necessarily true for mothers in part-time jobs. Thus the difference 
between mothers of old children and mothers of young children is expected to be larger in 
part-time jobs, because the former are less likely to have to deal with urgent childcare tasks, 
e.g., when children are sick. In the following, we provide results for part-time jobs 
(corresponding to a work time of less than 80%).  
 
Effects of Family Status and Family Type 
Table 3 shows the results of our multivariate analysis for part-time jobs. The design of the 
table follows Table 2, with the first two columns showing results without control variables, 
whereas subsequent columns successively add more covariates. 
Being married and childless is associated with a 4-6 percentage points lower callback 
rate, marginally significant in half of our specifications, compared to being single and 
childless. This finding is consistent with the idea that employers predict that children are 
                                                             
26 Throughout, in even-numbered columns, the t-tests of equality of coefficients with and without the “family 
completed” statement, have p-values larger than 0.1, indicating that equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at 
the 10% level. 
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imminently awaited, and that the employer may want to avoid pregnancy related costs. 
Women with two younger children and those with no information on family type do not 
significantly differ from the reference group in terms of callback rates. According to our 
even-numbered specifications, if anything, a married woman with young kids is hurt by the 
statement that she has already completed her family – possibly because it unwantedly draws 
attention to potential future childbearing.27 However, we recommend caution with respect to 
this result, given that the sample of women with such a statement is very small. 
A 30-year old mother of two old children, on the other hand, does not only convey the 
message that she is unlikely to have further children, but also that her children are unlikely to 
require immediate childcare, for example when being sick. Companies appear to welcome 
that message, as callback rates are significantly higher by 8-9 percentage points, compared to 
single and childless women.  
Given average callback rates of 19.22% for applications to part-time jobs, our results 
suggest substantial differences across family types, with a spread of 12-15 percentage points 
between married and childless women compared to those who are married with two older 
kids.  
 
Country-Specific Analyses  
Since callback differences by family status have been found only for part-time, it is fair to 
ask whether results are driven by one specific country or are common to all three German-
speaking countries in our analysis. Table 4 presents the respective results.28 It shows the 
richest set of specifications (mirroring columns 7 and 8 of Table 3) for Germany, 
Switzerland, and Austria, separately. The table illustrates that results go in the same direction 
(even if less significant due to the smaller sample sizes) across the three countries, with 
married, but childless women differing markedly in callback rates from women with two 
older children. This is the case even though all three countries have clear anti-discrimination 
laws where differential treatment based on sex or expected motherhood is forbidden. 
 
Secretaries vs. Accountants 
Throughout, we pool applicants to secretary and accountant jobs and include a dummy for 
secretaries (accountant being the default). When we split the sample by occupation (not 
reported), we find the same ordering of family types for applications to part-time jobs: 
                                                             
27 For specifications 4 and 6, the difference of coefficients is marginally significant (p=0.08, p=0.07). 
28 Table A.2 shows country-specific results for full-time jobs. Apart from the small sample size for Austria, the 
only thing to note is that results across all three countries are very similar to the pooled analysis: we find no 
evidence for a systematic difference in callback rates across family types in any of the three German-speaking 
countries. 
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married and childless women have lower callback rates than single childless women, and 
women with two old kids perform better than women with two young children. Both in terms 
of point estimates and in terms of statistical significance, results are somewhat stronger for 
accountants than for secretaries, particularly concerning the difference between single 
women and married women with no kids. This is consistent with the idea that secretaries can 
probably be more easily replaced than accountants: first, firms might have more secretaries 
than accountants, making the latter more pivotal; second, accountants have more specific 
job-related human capital which is harder to replace at short notice, should a female 
accountant go on maternity leave or be absent from work. 
 
Male Candidates 
Throughout the paper, our focus is on female applicants. Still, male candidates are an 
interesting point of comparison in our two female-dominated occupations. We show the 
respective results for full-time, where we have more data, in Table A.3. 
As we pointed out before, callback rates for men are substantially lower than for women. 
However, looking at family types, there is no discernible pattern for men neither for full-time 
nor part-time jobs (not shown), i.e. firms do not seem to consider information on a male 
applicant’s family important enough to make use of it for their hiring decisions. 
 
5.2 Effects of the Variance of Unobservable Determinants of Productivity 
Heckman and Siegelman (1993) first showed that differences in the variance of unobservable 
productivity determinants may bias the measurement of discrimination: Even in the absence 
of taste-based discrimination, without group differences in average unobservable 
characteristics, different variances in unobservable drivers of productivity may lead to 
differential treatment due to statistical discrimination.  
Notably, in a correspondence study, the direction of this “variance effect” depends on the 
quality level of the applicants, i.e., their observable productivity characteristics, set by the 
experimenter. For example, if the quality level of the fictitious candidates is low compared to 
their real-life competitors, an applicant from the group with the higher variance of 
unobservable characteristics will be treated more favourably by firms, because he or she will 
more likely pass the companies’ quality threshold. The reverse is true if the applicants are of 
high-quality.  
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Neumark (2012) developed a method to measure the “variance effect” and obtain an 
unbiased estimate of discrimination (see also Neumark and Rich, 2019), which we apply.29 
Given that in the linear probability model, for part-time jobs we found the most marked 
differences between married women without kids and married women with older kids, we 
focus on the comparison of these groups in the following (thus the smaller sample size). As 
Table 5, column 1, illustrates, for part time jobs, in the basic probit, married women with 
older children are 13 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than married 
women without children. This result is similar to the findings from the linear probability 
model. However, the Neumark decomposition illustrates that this effect is actually 
underestimated. Married women with older children have a lower standard deviation of 
unobservable vis-à-vis married women without children and suffer from a negative “variance 
effect”. Apparently, the relatively low quality of the experimental candidates in this setting 
has led to a relative advantage for the applicant from the higher variance group (the married 
women without children). Bare of this “variance effect”, the “unbiased level effect” favoring 
the mother of older children is even higher than in the linear probability model (25 
percentage points) and strongly significant, thus confirming more favourable treatment of 
women who have completed fertility (and who have little urgent childcare chores), or 
unfavourable treatment of women who likely start childbearing, respectively. 
As before, we do not find any differences between candidates for full-time jobs. This 
finding thus reinforces the conclusion from the linear probability model that family 
composition does not appear to be a factor taken into consideration by employers when 
making callback decisions for those jobs. 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In our large-scale correspondence study, we looked at discrimination in hiring in female-
friendly professions. We deliberately picked female-friendly professions (secretaries and 
accountants) to avoid comparing women to men in occupations where they may be 
considered less productive to begin with. This allowed us to focus on differences in 
callbacks for a variation of female applicants with different family profiles.  
Our study has several distinguishing features that set it apart from the small literature on 
what we call “fertility discrimination in hiring”. We indicate the probability of childbearing 
as well as childcare chores by varying information on marriage, presence on children and 
age of children, while holding applicant age and past work experience constant. The reason 
                                                             
29 Neumark and Rich (2019) use this method to re-assess several published studies of labour market 
discrimination. They find that with the proposed correction, just over half of the estimates of discrimination fall 
to near zero, become statistically insignificant, or change sign. 
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why this can be done inconspicuously is that in the German-speaking countries, which we 
examine, this information is routinely given on résumés. Different from earlier research, we 
send applications not only to full-time, but also to part-time jobs. 
Our conjecture is that employers consider childless, but married women, at particular 
“risk” of becoming pregnant. This is in line with stylized facts based on micro data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) showing that married but childless women are 
more likely to have children than childless singles. Thus, we hypothesize that married 
women without children are less likely to receive a callback than single women. At the same 
time, mothers of two young children are more likely to suffer from child-related absences 
than mothers of two older children. Also this stylized fact is based on GSOEP data. We 
therefore hypothesize that mothers of two older children receive more callbacks than 
mothers of young children.  
Concerning the difference between candidates applying to full- and part-time jobs we 
argue the following: Applicants to part-time jobs convey a desire to reconcile family duties 
with work. In contrast, applicants to full-time jobs signal that, independent of their family 
situation, they “must have” childcare arrangements in place, because otherwise they could 
not reconcile a full-time job with the logistics of picking up children from daycare or school. 
As a result, we expect differences in callbacks between mothers of old children vis-à-vis 
mothers of young children to be more pronounced for part-time work. For part-time, we also 
expect stronger differences between single and married women without children. The reason 
is that a married, but childless woman, who applies to a part-time job may be considered at a 
particular “risk” of becoming pregnant.  
We find that for applicants to full-time jobs, fertility-related information actually does not 
result in different callback rates.30 Apparently, employers rely on full-time applicants having 
their family-related issues dealt with. This finding is in line with a recent study by Bygren, 
Erlandsson and Gähler (2017) for Sweden and suggests that discrimination in full-time jobs 
is not based on considerations of potential family formation or family obligations. 
However, in line with our hypotheses, we find stronger differences looking at applicants 
to part-time jobs, where there is substantial variation in callback rates. Married, but childless 
women applying to part-time jobs have the lowest callback rates, and women with two older 
children the highest. The gap in callback rates between these two groups is 14 percentage 
points, which is substantial given average callback rates of 19 percent for part-time jobs. We 
interpret these findings as presence of substantial hiring discrimination based on realized and 
                                                             
30 We would like to stress that despite our large sample, the fact that, for full-time jobs, differences in callback 
rates between family types are not statistically significant, does not preclude that there are differences, as 
confidence intervals are compatible with some differences across types. 
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expected fertility for part-time jobs – a possibly surprising result, since these jobs are 
typically meant to be particularly family-friendly. 
One additional aspect we study is whether mothers of small children can signal to 
employers that they are not intending to have additional children. In German-speaking 
countries, it is common to use a statement saying “family completed” to signal that no 
further pregnancies are planned. We do not find differences in callback rates between 
mothers with two young children who use such statement in their cover letters compared to 
those who do not, on conventional statistical levels. This finding is consistent with the idea 
that employers consider such statements as cheap talk, however, given the relatively small 
sample of observations with such a statement, this interpretation has to be taken with 
caution. 
A lot of progress has been made over the last decades to help equal treatment of women 
in the labour market. Although employers’ concerns related to realized and expected 
motherhood is often believed to be the key driver for women’s inferior labor market chances, 
our findings do not provide evidence that such a mechanism persists in full-time jobs in the 
German-speaking countries today. However, maybe unexpected for many, our results for 
part-time jobs illustrates that employers are not fully immune to considering potential or 
realized motherhood in female applicants, even in female-friendly occupations. 
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Appendix 
 
Parental Leave and Equal Pay Policies in the German-Speaking Countries 
In Germany, paternity leave may be enjoyed by both parents. There is an initial period of 
paid leave covering the first 12 months of the baby’s life (possibly 14 if both parents take it). 
The leave can however be extended without pay up to 3 years. Under some conditions 
(including company size and length of the employment contract), there is the possibility to 
work part-time during the leave. Employment is protected for the entire duration of the 
parental leave, and parents have the right to return to their position before birth or to another 
one with identical conditions.   
In Austria, parental leave can last up to two years to be (possibly) shared by both parents.  
In addition to the possibility of working part-time during the leave, a unique feature of the 
Austrian system is the right to work part-time after the leave, up to the child’s 7th birthday.  
Income is partially covered during the leave and parents get to choose from a menu of 
different compensation possibilities and leave duration. As in Germany, salary payments 
during the leave are not borne by the employer. Financing of the parental leave systems 
across the three countries in our sample is based on contributions that all employers and 
employees pay regularly (wage deductions on employees and wage-related taxes born by 
companies). 
Switzerland offers the shortest period of maternity leave, 14 weeks. Mothers receive 80% 
of their former salary during the leave. The employer has the option to pay the remaining 
20% or to prolong the leave for another 2 weeks, to a total of 16. The law does not require 
the employer to accept a reduction in the workload upon the return of the mother, and the 
company is free to terminate the employment upon the end of the leave without any 
restrictions. Unlike Austria and Germany, there is no leave for fathers, though unions and 
companies usually foresee 1 to 3 days of vacation when the child is born and the possibility 
to take 1 to 3 weeks of unpaid vacation.  Given the short work disruption, the Swiss system 
is seemingly the least intrusive – unless any disruption is similarly costly to companies, 
irrespective of length (e.g., employers can hire replacement personnel for long-term, but not 
for short-term interruptions).   
Costs from the compliance to the regulations above and adapting company practices to 
the family situation of employees as a result is one argument often heard underlying 
potential statistical discrimination against women in fertile age. Employers may react by 
paying women lower wages, or simply by not hiring them. Indeed, the possibility that family 
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policies may backfire and result in negative labour market outcomes for women in terms of 
hiring, wages and promotions is well documented in the literature.31   
All three German-speaking countries have had legal provisions for gender equality in pay 
(‘equal pay for equal work’) for decades.32 For example, all countries have ratified the ILO 
Equal Remuneration Convention (C100). They have also ratified the Discrimination 
Convention (C111) and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. However, because equal pay has received increasing 
scrutiny in recent decades, it is possible that employers resort to hiring instead of wage 
discrimination, as the former is particularly likely to go unnoticed.33  
 
 
  
                                                             
31 See e.g. Datta Gupta, Smith and Verner (2008) for a discussion of the impact of the generosity of family 
policies in Nordic countries on female employment and wages, Neumark and Stock (2006) on the effects of state 
equal pay laws in the US on the relative employment of black and white females, and Blau and Kahn (2013) for 
an international comparison of the effects of family policies on labor force participation and other labor market 
outcomes of American women versus those in other countries.  
32 In Germany, Article 3 of the 1949 Constitution (‘Basic Law') provides for equal treatment of all citizens across 
essentially all areas of life. In Austria, the 1979 Act on Equal Treatment on Men and Women has the same 
purpose. In 1981, gender equality and equal pay for equal work were written into the Swiss constitution. 
33 In 2006, the Swiss Federal Office for Gender Equality created a tool to assist companies in evaluating whether 
or not they were paying equal wages for identical work. This policy tool is called logib and allows companies to 
resort to a widely used spreadsheet software to run a regression and evaluate the fairness of their pay structure by 
checking the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on a gender dummy. Germany (with logib-d) and 
Austria (with www.gehaltsrechner.gv.at) soon followed suit in devising and implementing similar policy tools. 
Vaccaro (2018) evaluated the success of the Swiss logib in reducing the gender wage gap (GWG) and found that 
this policy tool has led to a decline of 3.5pp in the unexplained part of the GWG, but of only 1.5pp on the raw 
wage gap.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Age Difference Between 2nd and 3rd Child 
 
Notes: Data from Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Displaying age difference between 2nd and 3rd child for mothers with at least own 3 
children. 
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Figure 2: Days Absent at Work 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data from Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Displaying days absent from work in previous year. Reasons displayed are absences 
because of own sickness, absences because of sick child, and other/unknown reasons. 
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Table 1: Callback rates 
Full-time Women   Men   
 
Callback rate 
(in %) 
Number of  
observations 
Callback rate  
(in %) 
Number of  
observations 
All countries 19.62 4245 11.53 2445 
Germany 20.82 2675 13.14 1621 
Switzerland 16.87 1156 9.07 562 
Austria 19.56 414 6.87 262 
Accountants 23.58 1887 16.72 1124 
Secretaries 16.45 2358 7.11 1321 
Single No Kids 20.58 933 11.89 429 
Married No Kids 19.42 937 9.62 405 
Married 2 Young Kids 18.36 719 12.41 588 
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement 
     Family Completed 17.61 636   
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement 
     Family Completed 24.10 83   
Married 2 Old Kids 19.64 718 13.25 596 
No Info on Family Status 19.83 938 9.37 427 
     
Part-time Women   Men   
 
Callback rate  
(in %) 
Number of  
observations 
Callback rate  
(in %) 
Number of  
observations 
All countries 19.22 1332 7.26 647 
Germany 23.59 534 8.51 329 
Switzerland 15.44 693 6.43 280 
Austria 21.90 105 2.63 38 
Accountants 25.56 626 9.22 358 
Secretaries 13.60 706 4.84 289 
Single No Kids 18.77 293 8.11 111 
Married No Kids 13.11 305 5.77 104 
Married 2 Young Kids 20.70 256 8.12 160 
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement 
     Family Completed 21.83 229   
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement 
     Family Completed 11.11 27   
Married 2 Old Kids 27.18 195 8.04 174 
No Info on Family Status 19.43 283 5.10 98 
 
Notes: The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Data collected by the authors between March 2013 
and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. Application packages consisted of a cover letter, a CV, language certificates, 
reference letters, as well as documents with degree and grade information. In all cases, two applications were sent to each company. We 
randomized the family status/composition, our treatment of interest, but also other elements in the CV such as the picture and name of the 
candidate as well as the general template of the application. (A template determined the general visual aspect of the application and was 
additionally tied in to a particular life story – birthplace, names of schools attended, jobs previously held, references, etc.).  
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Table 2: Probability of a callback for females applying to full-time jobs, all countries (LPM) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Married 2 Young Kids -0.022  -0.022  -0.026  -0.030  
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement  
     Family Completed  -0.030  -0.030  -0.033  -0.038* 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement  
     Family Completed  0.035  0.035  0.031  0.028 
  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Married 2 Old Kids -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
No Info on Family Status -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
City Dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Application Characteristics no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Firm Characteristics no no no no no no yes yes 
Constant 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.280*** 0.282*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060) 
Observations 4,245 4,245 4,245 4,245 4,245 4,245 4,233 4,233 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.034 0.034 0.041 0.041 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors 
are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the 
application was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, 
range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the 
workplace).    
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Table 3: Probability of a callback for females applying to part-time jobs, all countries (LPM) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids -0.057* -0.057* -0.041 -0.040 -0.044 -0.043 -0.052* -0.052* 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.019  0.037  0.030  0.021  
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement  
     Family Completed  0.031  0.049  0.043  0.032 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement  
     Family Completed  -0.077  -0.066  -0.075  -0.069 
  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.084** 0.084** 0.092** 0.092** 0.080** 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
No Info on Family Status 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
City Dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Application Characteristics no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Firm Characteristics no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 1,327 1,327 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.050 0.052 0.083 0.085 0.102 0.103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are 
clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application 
was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business 
activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the workplace).   
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Table 4: Probability of a callback for females applying to part-time jobs by country, 
(LPM) 
  Germany Switzerland Austria 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married No Kids -0.094* -0.093* -0.032 -0.032 -0.104 -0.101 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.036) (0.036) (0.136) (0.139) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.008   0.040   0.054  
 (0.063)   (0.044)   (0.143)  
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement  
     Family Completed   0.024  0.048  0.097 
   (0.065)  (0.046)  (0.161) 
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement  
     Family Completed   -0.134  -0.037  -0.080 
   (0.119)  (0.078)  (0.209) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.092 0.094 0.072 0.072 0.136 0.136 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.051) (0.051) (0.150) (0.150) 
No Info on Family Status -0.053 -0.052 0.027 0.027 0.049 0.055 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.140) (0.141) 
City Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.222 0.219 0.193* 0.187* -0.048 0.004 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.109) (0.109) (0.582) (0.585) 
Observations 533 533 689 689 105 105 
R-squared 0.120 0.122 0.098 0.099 0.246 0.251 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback 
measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies 
(Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for 
when the application was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile 
to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), 
sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from 
residence to the workplace).   
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Table 5: Decomposition results addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique: Comparison 
of married women without children and married women with two old children 
  PART-TIME  FULL-TIME  
  All Countries All Countries 
A. Basic probit model (marginal effects) 0.129*** 0.006 
 (0.033) (0.020) 
B. Heteroskedastic probit model (marginal effects)   
Children 0.011 0.004 
 (0.073) (0.021) 
C. Decomposition   
   
Marginal effect through level (unbiased) 0.246*** 0.021 
 (0.039) (0.076) 
   
Marginal effect through variance -0.234** -0.017 
 (0.106) (0.081) 
      
Standard deviation of unobservables:  
Married two old kids/Married no kids 0.354 0.932 
Wald test statistics:  
null hypothesis that ratio of standard deviations=1 (p-value) 0.001 0.830 
Wald test statistic: null hypothesis that ratio of coefficients are equal 0.992 0.889 
Number of observations  477 1571 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***, p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback 
measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: Country Dummies 
(Germany, Switzerland, Austria), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application was sent), Application 
Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), Firm 
Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the company 
(trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the workplace).   
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
    
Variables  Mean Standard deviation 
 
City Dummies 
   
Application in Bern  0.067 0.250 
Application in Zurich  0.202 0.401 
Application in Basel  0.041 0.199 
Application in Hamburg  0.106 0.307 
Application in Berlin  0.175 0.380 
Application in Munich  0.103 0.304 
Application in Frankfurt  0.040 0.196 
Application in Cologne  0.100 0.299 
Application in Stuttgart  0.072 0.258 
Application in Vienna  0.094 0.293 
 
Time Dummies 
   
Application sent in first quarter  0.154 0.361 
Application sent in second quarter  0.354 0.478 
Application sent in third quarter  0.283 0.450 
Application sent in fourth quarter  0.209 0.407 
Application sent in 2013  0.406 0.491 
Application sent in 2014  0.517 0.500 
Application sent in 2015  0.077 0.266 
 
Application Characteristics 
   
Application template  0.500 0.500 
Male applicant  0.357 0.479 
Female picture 1  0.327 0.469 
Female picture 2   0.316 0.465 
Male picture 1  0.173 0.378 
Male picture 2  0.184 0.387 
Advertisement for secretarial job  0.539 0.498 
Applicant is good fit for advertised joba  0.393 0.488 
Applicant is average fit for advertised jobb  0.359 0.480 
Applicant is bad fit for advertised jobc  0.248 0.432 
Application quality is averaged  0.414 0.493 
    
Firm Characteristics    
Firm’s business activities are local or regional  0.214 0.410 
Firm’s business activities are national  0.410 0.492 
Firm’s business activities are international  0.376 0.485 
Firm has between 0 and 20 employees  0.194 0.396 
Firm has between 21 and 50 employees  0.167 0.373 
Firm has between 51 and 100 employees  0.160 0.367 
Firm has between 101 and 250 employees  0.173 0.379 
Firm has between 251 and 500 employees  0.110 0.313 
Firm has between 501 and 1000 employees  0.067 0.250 
Firm has more than 1000 employees  0.128 0.334 
Firm in the Public sector  0.045 0.208 
Firm in the Trade/Wholesale sector  0.137 0.344 
Firm in the Manufacturing sector  0.193 0.394 
Firm in the Service sector  0.625 0.484 
Distance between home and firm > 20km  0.254 0.435 
Firm with explicit antidiscrimination policye  0.028 0.166  
Notes: N = 8,669, all variables take the value 0 or 1.  
Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment.  
a Applicant fulfills all requirements for advertised position. 
b Applicant lacks only minor requirements for the advertised position. 
c Applicant lacks one major or two minor requirements for the advertised position.  
d Application does not include English and IT certificates. 
e An explicit antidiscrimination policy can be found on the company’s website. 
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Table A.2: Probability of a callback for females applying to full-time jobs by countries, 
(LPM) 
 
  Germany Switzerland Austria 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married No Kids -0.013 -0.013 -0.019 -0.018 0.032 0.032 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.057) (0.057) 
Married 2 Young Kids -0.024   -0.031   -0.018  
 (0.026)   (0.035)   (0.056)  
     Married 2 Young Kids, No Statement  
     Family Completed   -0.029  -0.040  -0.030 
   (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.060) 
     Married 2 Young Kids, Statement  
     Family Completed   0.019  0.052  0.033 
   (0.064)  (0.099)  (0.095) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.001 0.001 -0.039 -0.039 0.093 0.093 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.063) (0.063) 
No Info on Family Status 0.005 0.005 -0.031 -0.031 0.054 0.054 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.062) (0.062) 
City Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Dummies (Year and Quarter) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.414*** 0.417*** -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.125) (0.125) 
Observations 2,671 2,671 1,148 1,148 414 414 
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.070 0.071 0.106 0.107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback 
measures whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies 
(Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for 
when the application was sent), Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile 
to vacancy, quality of application), Firm Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), 
sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from 
residence to the workplace).   
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Table A.3: Probability of a callback for males applying to full-time jobs by country, (LPM) 
  All Countries Germany Switzerland Austria 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Married No Kids -0.023 -0.023 -0.041 -0.045 0.014 0.028 0.002 -0.024 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) (0.048) (0.056) 
Married 2 Young Kids 0.005 0.001 -0.010 -0.014 0.048 0.059 -0.022 -0.040 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) 
Married 2 Old Kids 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.048) (0.052) 
No Info on Family Status -0.025 -0.026 -0.030 -0.028 -0.056* -0.050 0.055 0.052 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.052) (0.055) 
City Dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Time Dummies  
(Year and Quarter) no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Application Characteristics no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Firm Characteristics no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Constant 0.119*** 0.148** 0.142*** 0.158 0.087*** 0.199** 0.059* 0.086 
 (0.016) (0.058) (0.023) (0.098) (0.028) (0.083) (0.033) (0.080) 
Observations 2,445 2,440 1,621 1,620 562 558 262 262 
R-squared 0.002 0.044 0.003 0.046 0.013 0.092 0.009 0.111 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Data collected by the authors between March 2013 and June 2015 in a correspondence testing field experiment. The variable callback measures 
whether an applicant was invited for an interview. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Controls are: City Dummies (Zurich, Basel, Hamburg, 
Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, Stuttgart, Vienna, Bern), Time Dummies (quarter as well as year dummies for when the application was sent), 
Application Characteristics (application template, individual picture used, occupation, quality of fit of the profile to vacancy, quality of application), Firm 
Characteristics (dummies for firm size, range of business activities (regional, national, international), sector of activity of the company (trade/wholesale, 
manufacturing, services, public sector), firm has antidiscrimination policy, distance from residence to the workplace).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
